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Abstract. The disaster occurring in the Eastern Italian Alps
in the summer of 1985 was caused by the failure of two tail-
ings dams located just upstream from the village of Stava
in the municipality of Tesero (Trento province, Italy). The
structure comprised two small storage basins for the deposi-
tion of tailings from the separation process of the Prestavel
ﬂuorite mine. On their downstream sides, the basins were
contained by steep earth embankments, whereas upstream
they rested directly on the natural slope. The total height
from the base of the lower dam to the crest of the upper dam
was over 50m.
On 19 July 1985, the front of the upper dam suddenly
burst, triggering a vast mudﬂow (180000m3) that ﬂowed
down-channel through Stava, a small village of 20 buildings.
The mudﬂow rapidly traveled over 4.2km along the Stava
Valley and passed through Tesero, before ﬂowing into the
Avisio River. The mudﬂow destroyed many buildings and
resulted in 268 fatalities and 20 injuries. From an analysis
of the data collected and ﬁeld observation, several factors
may be cited as having contributed to increasing instabil-
ity, as the upper dam continued to be raised until the dis-
astrous collapse of 19 July. Foremost among these factors
is the mistaken assumption that the tailings deposited in the
impoundments would consolidate fairly quickly. Indeed, no
monitoring system was ever installed to verify the assumed
consolidation. Other operational shortcomings and construc-
tion errors were contributing factors. Regulations requiring
construction standards, operational monitoring, and indepen-
dent periodic inspection could have prevented this disaster.
Comprehensive legislation is required to effectively limit the
adverse consequences of tailings dam failures by providing a
regulatory environment where the safety and welfare of the
localareacanbebalancedwiththeeconomicbeneﬁtsofmin-
ing operations.
1 Introduction
Building codes and construction standards ensure the safety
and function of the environment in which we live and work.
While these codes and standards are typically adopted at
a national level, their application and enforcement is com-
monly the responsibility of counties, municipalities, and
towns. This local application and enforcement is crucial to
transforming the intent, represented by the codes and stan-
dards, into the reality of safe, functional structures and facil-
ities we depend on every day. Certain specialized structures
and facilities may have national standards, which are applied
through specialized national or regional government agen-
cies. This is often the case for large dams used for hydroelec-
tric generation, water resources, and ﬂood control. However,
it is not uncommon for local government to be responsible
for the application and enforcement of standards for smaller
dams. Dams needed to impound tailings from mine opera-
tions would be included among the small dams where local
governments would exert this authority.
Tailing impoundment dams represent a specialized class
of this type of structure. Large dams are commonly designed
with the expectation that the structure will exist for a long
time. The design life for major structures is usually between
50 and 100 years. This design life can be extended by careful
maintenance of a well-placed and well-designed large dam.
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Fig. 1. Stava village and the Prestavel basins in the ofﬁcial map
before the collapse. Red lines show failure and the path of the mud-
ﬂow (courtesy of Fondazione Stava, 1985).
Most people expect a large dam will continue to be in service
beyond their lifetime. In contrast, the design life of tailing
dams is determined by the operational life of the mine, the
period that processing will generate tailings for disposal, or
the physical site conditions that may limit future expansion.
Once the need for a particular tailings dam ceases, it is ex-
pected that reclamation of the dam and tailings will result in
their becoming a stable feature within the local landscape.
Failures of tailings dams have caused injuries and fatali-
ties, damaged and destroyed property, and inﬂicted environ-
mental damage worldwide (Rico et al., 2008; WUP, 2011).
As recently as the period from July 2009 to July 2011, major
failures are known to have taken place in China, Hungary,
Russia, and Peru (WUP, 2011). It is unlikely that these are
the only occurrences during this period. The 2010 release
of 700000m3 of caustic, bright red slurry in Kolont´ ar, Hun-
gary from the tailings dam failure at the MAL Magyar Alu-
minum plant was a graphic recent event seen by television
news viewers around the globe. Rico et al. (2008) reviewed
available databases for reported tailings dam failures world-
wide through 2007. Their analysis found that over 85% of
the incidents involved tailings dams associated with active
operations. Also, they identiﬁed ﬁve characteristics that re-
sult in tailings dams being more prone to failure than other
comparable dam types (Rico et al., 2008): (1) embankments
formed by locally collected ﬁlls (soil, coarse waste, slurry
from mining operations and tailings); (2) dams subsequently
raised as solid material coupled with a severe increase in ef-
ﬂuent (plus runoff precipitation); (3) lack of regulations on
speciﬁc design criteria; (4) lack of dam stability require-
ments regarding continuous monitoring and control during
emplacement, construction and operation; (5) high cost of
maintenance work for tailings dams after closure of mining
activities. This paper will look at a well-documented exam-
ple of a tailings dam failure, the 1985 Stava, Italy event. This
case study will illustrate how this disaster was more a result
of improper application of technical knowledge than the lack
of that knowledge. It will also demonstrate that continued
adverse impacts on local populations has more to do with the
absence of a legislative framework for regulating these facil-
ities than a lack of understanding of basic factors leading to
catastrophic failure.
2 The event
At twenty-three minutes after noon on 19 July 1985, the
upper dam of two silting basins used for the disposal and
cleansing of ﬂuorite mine tailings collapsed. The result-
ing rift allowed water and sediment to pour into the lower
impoundment, which also collapsed. This mixture of wa-
ter, sediment and debris became a mudﬂow that spanned
about 250m upstream from Stava (municipality of Tesero,
Val di Fiemme, province of Trento). As the mudﬂow passed
through Stava, it razed all 20 buildings before continuing
along the Stava Valley before passing through Tesero and
ﬂowing into the Avisio River. This catastrophic mudﬂow
rapidly traveled 4.2km along the Stava valley. In addition to
buildings destroyed along its track, 268 lives were lost, 100
peoplewereinjuredandonly8victimsrescuedalive(Lucchi,
2002). The disaster caused damage valued at about 133 mil-
lion euros (Lucchi, 2011).
3 Characteristics of the Prestavel mine tailings
impoundments
Information on the Prestavel basins was taken from docu-
ments describing the technical characteristics of the tailings
impoundments (C.T.A., 1986). Just prior to the disaster,
the disposal facility comprised two impoundments contain-
ing the wet, ﬁne-grained particles(referred to as silt) from
the cleansing of waste materials extracted from the Prestavel
mine (Fig. 1). The impoundments were arranged in step
form so that the upper basin decanted into the lower one.
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 12, 1029–1044, 2012 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/12/1029/2012/F. Luino and J. V. De Graff: The Stava mudﬂow of 19 July 1985 (Northern Italy) 1031 FIGURES 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Stava village and the Prestavel basins in 
the  official  map  before  the  collapse.  Red  lines 
show  failure  and  the  path  of  the  mudflow 
(courtesy of Fondazione Stava 1985). 
Fig.  2  –  Graphical  representation of the 
Prestavel  basins:   A) upper  basin;   B) lower 
basin; 1)  cyclone,  2) sandy  deposit,  3) silty 
deposit;  4)  drainage  service; 5)  emergency 
drainage;  6)  service  road; 7) sand cone;  8) 
silty  deposit;  9)  drainage  from  the  upper 
basin; 10) Caretaker’s house. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 – 1981‐82: bottom view of the two 
basins almost completely replanted. It is 
possible to notice the progressive levels 
of growth achieved by hydrocyclone and 
the caretaker's house in the foreground 
(courtesy of Fondazione Stava 1985). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the Prestavel basins: (A) upper
basin; (B) lower basin; (1) cyclone, (2) sandy deposit, (3) silty de-
posit, (4) drainage service, (5) emergency drainage,(6) service road,
(7) sand cone, (8) silty deposit, (9) drainage from the upper basin,
(10) caretaker’s house.
Both basins had earth dams facing the valley and the moun-
tain slopes. Laterally, the upper basin dam abutted against
a densely forested slope. Its front embankment rested partly
on the silt of the lower basin; this conﬁguration reduced the
surface area of the dam face (Fig. 2). Structurally, the dams
were composed principally of medium-ﬁne sand and thin or
fairly uniform layers of saturated clayey silt.
The elevation of the lower impoundment was 1350.80m,
or a maximum dam height over ground level of about 22–
23m. At the time of the disaster, the maximum elevation
of the dam crest was 1378.83m, or a maximum dam height
of about 28m. Viewed as a single section, with one dam
face directly above the other, the structure was presented as
a loose earth embankment over 50m high (Fig. 3).
After the creation of the upper impoundment, the surface
area of the lower impoundment was about 6500m2 and its
storage capacity about 100000m3. The upper impoundment,
located immediately behind and upstream from the lower
one, had a surface area of about 9800m2 and a storage ca-
pacity of about 150000m3.
Analyses revealed that the geotechnical characteristics of
the materials (Chandler and Tosatti, 1995) taken from the im-
poundment dams were remarkably homogeneous: the range
of the shear strength angle was between 33◦ and 37◦; the
cohesion was zero (the Atterberg limits were either not de-
terminable or gave consistency indices (CI) between −0.4
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Fig. 3. 1981–1982: bottom view of the two basins almost com-
pletely replanted. It is possible to notice the progressive levels of
growth achieved by hydrocyclone and the caretaker’s house in the
foreground (courtesy of Fondazione Stava, 1985).
and 0); only one sample from all those known taken had a CI
of 0.2; the permeability coefﬁcients (k) at the site and in the
laboratory varied between 10−3 and 10−6 cms−1 depending
on the type of material, moisture, and density.
Because the sands came from the grinding and cleansing
of materials extracted from the mine, they were more coarse
and well-classiﬁed (uniformity coefﬁcient between 2 and 4);
because of their grain size and permeability coefﬁcient (k =
10−3–10−4 cms−1), they were considered suitable for dam
construction.
The investigations also showed that while the lower dam
rested on natural ground, the upper basin rested on natural
ground only along its sides, whereas its front embankment,
judging from a reconstruction of the dam geometries prior to
collapse, rested, in part, on the sediments of the lower im-
poundment. The ﬁne sands constituting the dams and nearly
the entire silt in the basins, to a depth of 7–8m, had a mois-
ture rate of about 20–35%.
Two systems of tailings slurry disposal were employed:
on-dam cycloning and central cycloning (USEPA, 1994). In
on-dam cycloning, as shown in Fig. 4, the slurry is cycloned
from the tailings materials using hydrocyclones moving on
rails, which separate the larger tailings sand sized particles
from the ﬁner silt. The coarse materials deposit to form the
dam crest, while the ﬁner tailings are routed to the interior of
the impoundment, where they deposit according to particle
size, and form a sloping tailings beach surface along the in-
terior perimeter of the dam. Central, or stationary, cycloning
usually places a single cyclone over an abutment of the dam.
A pool of clariﬁed water accumulates upstream from the tail-
ings sand beach. The dam crest is formed by cyclone sands
mechanically moved from the cyclone location to the dam
crest using a dragline or bulldozer.
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Fig. 4. The embankments of the landﬁll minings are made through
a process of centrifugation in a hydrocyclone in which are chan-
neled the mud; sand is separated and used to realize the embank-
ment, while the ﬁner fraction, constituted by silty mud to settle, is
discharged into the reservoir through a pipe (from Watermeyer and
Williamson, 1979, modiﬁed).
From ﬁndings in the area, photographs of the impound-
ments before the disaster and other sources, it appears cer-
tain that, at least within the upper basin, a ﬁxed cyclone at
the northern edge of the upper impoundment was used dur-
ing the last three years of operation. After densiﬁcation, the
hydrocycloned sands went into the construction of the dam
raise near the cyclone, whereas the remaining part of the dam
was constructed by mechanically transporting the sand from
the point of deposit.
Developing a tailings sand beach along the entire inter-
nal perimeter of a dam is generally given great importance
insofar as natural compaction of the deposit will ensure im-
permeability of the interior wall of the dam, thus, preventing
ﬁltration. In this way, risk of piping and siphoning would be
prevented as would the creation of pressure heads that could
destabilize the work. With this method, the downstream foot
of the upper dam came to rest on the sediments of the lower
impoundment. The upper dam was raised using the upstream
method construction, which relied chieﬂy on the support of
the silt deposits in the lower impoundment for subsequent
raising. These deposits were, in general, diffusely com-
posed of thin, poorly densiﬁed layers, which differed from
layer to layer, with some being composed of “loose” satu-
rated sediments and others partially cohesive. In total, about
400000m3 of deposited material were impounded. Among
all factors listed for dam failure, without doubt, the mistaken
assumption that the tailings deposited in the impoundments
would consolidate fairly quickly appears surely to be the
main reason for the collapse.
4 Uncontrolled development of the Prestavel mine tail-
ings dams
The ﬁrst written document on the Mount Prestavel mining
dates back to 1528. While the early mining exploited argen-
tiferous galena, ﬂuorite became the focus of mining begin-
ning in 1934 through to the time of the disaster. It was not
this change in the ore being exploited in the Prestavel mine
that led to the 1985 disaster. Rather, it was the decision to
change processing methods for reﬁning the extracted ﬂuo-
rite. In 1961, the operating company decided to use a ﬂota-
tion system in order to produce ﬂuorite at the 97–98% purity
required for the chemical industry. Until then, a gravimetric
system that did not require water-produced ﬂuorite at a pu-
rity of 75–85% was suitable for the steel industry. The ﬂota-
tion plant would require plenty of water and, nearby, an area
suitable for decanting and landﬁlling the wet sludge leftover
from the process. The plant was established on the moun-
tainside, at an altitude of 1420m, together with an aqueduct,
a cable car to transport the extracted material from the mine
andachairliftfortransportingworkers. Therequireddecant-
ing and landﬁlling of the process waste would utilize tailings
basins formed using the waste material to construct the re-
taining dams. Initial processing at the plant was more than
150t per day with the potential for 200t per day.
Data on the natural conditions of the area prior to con-
struction of the impoundment dams were gleaned from his-
torical records to reconstruct an accurate account of the var-
ious phases of development of the two basins up to their ﬁ-
nal geometrical conﬁguration. The analysis was based on
the following documents: (a) geological, mining and tech-
nical bibliography, (b) thematic maps (IGM topography and
Autonomous Province of Trento, geology and morphology),
and (c) aerial photographs taken at different times.
The Prestavel mine had been in operation since the 16th
century (Perna, 1964). It was initially developed for the ex-
traction of small deposits of argentiferous galena. In 1934
mining at Prestavel was redirected to the extraction of ﬂuo-
rite. The processing needs of the extracted ﬂuorite provided
the impetus for construction of the tailings basins from 1961
to the time of their failure on 19 July 1985 (Table 1).
In 1961 the concessionary company built a new plant
(Ministero dell’Industria Commercio Artigianato, 1935–
1980) for separating ore from waste to process ﬂuorine to
“acid grade” (97% CaF) for use in the chemical industry.
This resulted in two signiﬁcant changes in the operations at
the Prestavel Mine. First, the average maximum produc-
tion of mine-run material increased from the earlier rate of
30tday−1 to 200tday−1 (Morra and Vighi, 1964). Second,
the processing of the extracted ﬂuorite by washing and sort-
ing was replaced by a ﬂoatation treatment system. Both the
volume of tailings material produced and the greater amount
of water involved required disposal in a tailings basin sys-
tem. The ﬁrst basin was constructed (i.e. the lower impound-
ment described in the previous section) for the disposal and
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Table 1. History of the Prestavel mining management.
Time Mine operator or concession holder Mining operations Tailings basins
1700s–1934 Prestavel Mine started. Various entities
owned or operated it
Intermittent operations to extract small
deposits of argentiferous galena
1934–1944 Societ` a Atesina per l’Esplorazione
Mineraria granted concession
6 March 1935
Begins mining ﬂuorite seams
1944
Montecatini Company
The maximum production rate of
mine-run material is 30tday−1 on av-
erage sold as ﬂux to steel industry
1961 New plant installed to process ﬂuo-
rine to “acid grade” (97% CaF) by
ﬂoatationforuseinthechemicalindus-
try; mine-run material increased up to
200tday−1
First tailings basin
(lower) constructed;
begins being used in
1962
1967 Montedison company (Montecatini
Edison) is granted concession on
5 May 1967.
Mining activity declines due to seams
playing out; mine operations cease in
1969
1968–1969
1970 Mining activity resumes at previous
rate due to discovery of new seams;
ﬂoatation processing used for enrich-
ment
Second tailings
(upper) basin con-
structed; begins
use
1976–1979 Montedison transfers mining license to
Fluromine
1980–1982 Concession granted to Prealpi
Mineraria in May 1980
Differentsystemusedforenrichingﬂu-
orite
Basins not used
1982–1985 Mineral ﬂoatation processing of ﬂuo-
rite resumes
Both basins in use
19 July 1985 Tailings Basins fail
cleansing of waste from the new treatment plant. The dam
was raised in Pozzole, about 400m away from the mineral
processing buildings. Rossi (1973) described the site where
the basins were built as follows:
“The ground around the clearing was water-
logged: the geotechnical tests revealed that it was
not very resistant to the load (as determined by in-
situ load tests, the breaking stress was 0.2kgcm−2
in some points). For this reason, special care
was needed for making the clear water drainage
pipeline. The structure was not rigid, but rather
composed of a series of monolithic elements, each
measuring over 10m long and connected by “G”
joints to allow for distortion resulting from subsi-
dence of the land forming the bottom of the basin.
The drainage pipeline ended in a limnological tank
to permit monitoring of the physical-chemical and
biological conditions of the efﬂuent and their pos-
sible correction. These precautions were taken in
agreement with the engineers of the Civil Engi-
neering Corps; however, there was concern about
clean water being returned to the Stava stream (a
tributary of the Avisio River) and rightly so, since
it could threaten the aquatic wildlife and damage
the power installations of the many sawmills in the
valley”.
A summary of the geomorphological characteristics of the
area selected for construction of the upper basin was ob-
tained by examining geological and topographic maps drawn
prior to basin construction and from an interpretative study
of aerial photographs taken by the Gruppo Aerofotogram-
metrico Italiano in August and October 1954. As shown on
the Italian Geological Map (Map No. 22, “Feltre”), nearly
the entire area around Pozzole is covered by a layer of
moraine from the last glaciations. The average gradient
along the axial sector, where the basin was built, is about
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Fig. 5. Aerial view of the basins in October 1973, nearly two years
after the construction of upper basin; in this one is in progress the
raising of the embankment from the orographic left side (photo Im-
presa Rossi, Brescia).
9◦. Stereoscopic study of the aerial photographs taken at the
time shows an area composed of a broad valley covered with
meadows and woodlands, slightly narrower downstream and
hollowed out along the central axis. The meadows contain
widespread wetlands which appear darker in the photographs
due to numerous springs and ponds. Both sides of the valley
abutting the dam embankments are composed primarily of
colluvial and debris deposits from the slopes of Mount Cucal
(layers of sandstone and limestone) and Pala di Santa (rhy-
olitic volcanics), respectively.
No aerial documentation dating from the 1960s was found,
which could allow the progressive development of the basins
to be followed. Nonetheless, it was clear from interviews
with local residents that the lower impoundment dam was
11m high in 1967 and was raised to approximately 23m
by 1985. Dam raising for the upper impoundment began
in 1970–1971. An aerial photograph taken in October 1973
(Impresa di Rilevamento Aereo Rossi, Brescia) (Fig. 5)
shows that the basin had already been in use for at least sev-
eral years and that the embankment had reached an altitude
of 1363m, approximately 12.2m in height over the dam crest
of the lower basin (1350.80m).
The aerial photograph taken in October 1973 shows that,
in the lower basin, water pooled on the surface delimited by
the embankment, directly reaching the sandy restraint levee
and submerging the previously mentioned “beach” formed
by silts to protect the internal facing. A pipeline leading from
the upper impoundment and running along the crest of the
lower dam (right side), gave rise to a small “delta”, emerging
from the water and measuring a few square meters in area.
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September  1978.  The  geometry  of  the  upper 
basin  seems  altered  with  respect  to  the 
previous photo: works to rise the embankment 
according to the scheme "upstream" are clearly 
in progress (photo Impresa Rossi, Brescia). 
 
Fig. 6. The decantation basins photographed in September 1978.
The geometry of the upper basin seems altered with respect to the
previous photo: works to raise the embankment according to the
scheme “upstream” are clearly in progress (photo Impresa Rossi,
Brescia).
The entire surface of the sub-rectangular upper impound-
ment was also covered by water, which appeared very cloudy
and was in direct contact with the embankment almost every-
where. Dam raising with the cyclone method was clearly in
progress on the left side, starting from the crest of the basin’s
northern end.
An aerial photograph taken in September 1978 (Fig. 6)
shows that while the geometry of the lower basin had re-
mained basically unchanged, that of the upper basin ap-
pears planimetrically and altimetrically different from pre-
vious photographs. The crest of the embankment was esti-
mated to be at 1373m or about 10m higher than in 1973. A
few meters further down, a berm, built to break the steep gra-
dient of the external face (39◦), ran along the entire perimeter
of the embankment at an average elevation of 1371m. Also
in this photograph, evidence of dam raising can be clearly
observed on the left side, starting from its northern end. The
basin appears slightly extended, forming a triangle towards
its northern end and reaching further upstream.
As in the lower impoundment, water appeared to be in di-
rect contact with the embankment almost everywhere. An
exception was the connection sector with the upper embank-
ment, where there was an exposed deposit large enough to
take up the basin’s southwestern corner. In this sector, the
dam crest was arranged and remodeled. The external face of
the lower embankment basin was covered by grass.
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Fig. 7 ‐ The Pozzole basins in the summer 1983. 
The  top  of  the  upper  embankment  appears 
amply  broadened  and  leveled.  It  is  also 
remarkable the development of the delta deposit 
at the left end of the upper basin, next to the 
place of cyclone operation (photo Impresa Rossi, 
Brescia). 
Fig. 7. The Pozzole basins in the summer 1983. The top of the
upper embankment appears amply broadened and leveled. Also no-
ticeable is the development of the delta deposit at the left end of the
upper basin, next to the place of cyclone operation (photo Impresa
Rossi, Brescia).
An aerial photograph taken in 1983 (Fig. 7) reveals the
later changes mainly involving the upper impoundment. It
demonstrates more or less completed banking of the entire
embankment. By this time it had reached an altitude of
1376m, about 3m higher than in 1978 and about 13m higher
than in 1973. In both basins, the water appears whitish and
very murky. The upper impoundment is more signiﬁcantly
enlarged by the deposit at “delta” fed by the cyclone in-
stalled at the basin’s northern end. Along the south side and
frontally, water touches the internal face of the embankment.
Theaerialphotographtakenin1983showsverynoticeable
lighter, elongated patches on the external face and the right
side of both embankments. Almost all the embankment of
the upper basin appears raised in comparison with the previ-
ous image and the height was realized using the “upstream”
construction method.
No photographic documentation was available for the pe-
riod between autumn 1983 and July 1985. From the land
survey carried out on behalf of the Court of Trento on the
embankment sectors that remained from the left bank of the
upper basin, it appears that the height of the dam crest on
the day of the disaster was 1378.83m. Therefore, it can be
reasonably assumed that, at least in part, the dam had been
raised by 5.83m over the height estimated from the aeropho-
togrammetric map of 1983. In summary, from 1971 until the
collapse of 19 July 1985, the height of the upper impound-
ment dam was increased by about 28m.
 
 
 
Fig. 8 – The Pozzole basins and the upper part of the mudflow some hour after the disaster. The large displacement 
of dam material is observable  in the frontal sector of the upper embankment and the tracks of the scarps for the 
detachment and outflow of the materials deposited in the basin. On the left side, the sandy‐silty deltaic deposit has 
remained almost completely in place. The remains of the lower embankment appear slightly in relief under the 
muddy covering. The photograph, processed using ArcView GIS and thus slightly deformed due to the collimation 
with the elements of the Regional Technical Map, shows the traces of the external walls of the destroyed buildings. 
(photo Aeron. Mil., conc. S.M.A. n. 623, 19 July 1985). 
Fig. 8. The Pozzole basins and the upper part of the mudﬂow a few
hours after the disaster. The large displacement of dam material is
observable in the frontal sector of the upper embankment and the
tracks of the scarps for the detachment and outﬂow of the materi-
als deposited in the basin. On the left side, the sandy-silty deltaic
deposit has remained almost completely in place. The remains of
the lower embankment appear slightly in relief under the muddy
covering. The photograph, processed using ArcView GIS and thus
slightly deformed due to the collimation with the elements of the
Regional Technical Map, shows the traces of the external walls of
the destroyed buildings (photo Aeron. Mil., conc. S.M.A. no. 623,
19 July 1985).
5 The mudﬂow along the Stava valley
The following is an examination of the dynamics of the Stava
valley mudﬂow reconstructed from surveys conducted start-
ing the day after the disaster, eyewitness accounts, and anal-
ysis of the documentation. The Pozzole basin embankments
failed at 12:22:55 on 19 July 1985, accompanied by a “hol-
low rumble” that some eyewitnesses said sounded like a
“strong blast of explosives being detonated”. A large mass
of mud poured from the upper to the lower impoundment
and then ﬂowed downslope below (Fig. 8), spreading later-
ally in a wave at least 250m wide upstream from the village
of Stava. Hundreds of tall trees (spruce and larch) were lit-
erally “cut down” just above the roots (Fig. 9). People living
on the slope opposite the Pozzole basin stated that “the trees
were swept off the ground” by the shock wave of air pushed
forward by the moving mass. Air blasts causing a similar ef-
fect proceeded some large, rapidly-moving rock falls (Wiec-
zorek et al., 2000).
After destroying houses on the hillside below the im-
poundments, the mudﬂow hit Stava on the valley ﬂoor, a vil-
lage composed of about 20 buildings on the left bank of the
stream (Fig. 10). In this area of conﬂuence between the Poz-
zole basin and the Stava valley, the muddy mass was forced
to follow a superelevated path that curved to the right (650m
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/12/1029/2012/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 12, 1029–1044, 20121036 F. Luino and J. V. De Graff: The Stava mudﬂow of 19 July 1985 (Northern Italy)  
 
    
Fig. 9 – A slope sector at the foot of the Pozzole 
basins, just upstream  the Stava  village. The 
photograph  shows a  thin  layer  of  mud  left 
behind  as  the  mudflow  moved  downstream. 
The effects on the ground and the destructive 
effects  on forest  cover  are  also  visible 
(photograph CNR‐IRPI Torino, July 20, 1985). 
Fig. 10 ‐ Area where Stava village once stood. 
The mudflow in this urbanized sector reached a 
maximum height of 14 m in the middle of the 
valley bottom; all buildings were destroyed at 
the  ground  level.  The  mud‐covered  Pozzole 
slope (Fig. 6) is visible in the upper left side of 
the  picture  (photograph  CNR‐IRPI  Torino,  July 
20, 1985). 
 
 
   
 
 
Fig. 11 ‐ Mudflow path of July 19, 1985 along the Stave Valley showing different effects observed 
by the geologists of CNR‐IRPI, Torino during the first surveys.  The locations of twenty‐two cross‐
sections measured during the survey are highlighted.  The original map base is 1:5.000 scale (from 
Govi and Luino, 2003, modified). 
Fig. 9. A slope sector at the foot of the Pozzole basins, just up-
stream the Stava village. The photograph shows a thin layer of mud
left behind as the mudﬂow moved downstream. The effects on the
ground and the destructive effects on forest cover are also visible
(photograph CNR-IRPI Torino, 20 July 1985).
in radius), which considerably increased its thickness on the
opposite side. Speciﬁc trigonometric measurements regis-
tered a maximum difference in height of about 19m com-
pared to the minimal thickness found on the right side of the
valley (Govi and Luino, 2003). Stava, therefore, suffered
the most devastating effects; it was completely razed to the
ground (Fig. 11, sections 4 and 5 and Fig. 12).
In the plain just downstream from Stava, the translational
motion slowed down, which affected its width. This ﬂat sec-
tor was the site of mud deposition in signiﬁcantly greater
amounts (thickness=1–3m) than elsewhere in the valley.
There was also abundant ponding of water primarily due to
containmentbytheroadembankmentofthevillage. Toallow
rescue teams access through the ﬂuid mass, the road embank-
ment had to be cut to drain the murky water. The width of the
mudﬂow (in cross section), already reduced near Stava, de-
creased by nearly half at 850m downstream from the village.
The width of the mudﬂow track gradually decreased in area
along this segment. A more marked decrease (from 800m2
to 460m2) began downstream from Maso Sfronzon (Fig. 11,
sections 8 and 9). This may have been due to acceleration
of the movement and loss of material deposited at a morpho-
logical step protruding from the left side, which narrowed the
valley.
All along the next segment of more than 1.6km, up to the
ﬁrst houses in Tesero, the ﬂuid mass moved with relatively
greater continuity because of channeling in narrower sec-
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Fig. 10. Area where Stava village once stood. The mudﬂow in
this urbanized sector reached a maximum height of 14m in the
middle of the valley bottom; all buildings were destroyed at the
ground level. The mud-covered Pozzole slope (Fig. 6) is visible
in the upper left side of the picture (photograph CNR-IRPI Torino,
20 July 1985).
tions, although with more or less large ﬂuctuations in cross-
sectional width and height depending on the sectors where
the mudﬂow had to adapt to the narrowing and curvature
of the valley axis. The width of the track occupied by the
mudﬂow decreased progressively from 90m to 50m (min-
imum value) in the segment immediately downstream from
the football ﬁeld in Tesero (Fig. 11, section 15). In this seg-
ment, the size of the moving mass was signiﬁcantly reduced
by deposits left on the right side of the valley and because
of the collapse of industrial buildings just upstream from the
football ﬁeld.
With the debris picked up along its path, the mudﬂow
regained some volume and proceeded downstream, with
greater pulsated movement of translation. Nearly the en-
tire row of buildings on the right bank of the Stava stream
in Tesero was completely destroyed (Fig. 13). Also in this
case, an eyewitness on the higher bridge in Tesero a few min-
utes before 12:30 said he saw some superstructures of the
sawmill, about 500m upstream, “go ﬂying” a few seconds
before the mudﬂow hit them (Govi and Luino, 2003). Just
upstream from Tesero there are two arch bridges. The older
bridge was built at the beginning of the 19th century and the
other one much more recently. Their respective height is 16
and 19m over the valley bottom. The mudﬂow slowed sig-
niﬁcantly and swelled in height because of the curvature of
the narrow valley and because of the bridge underpasses, es-
pecially the narrower span of the older bridge. A portion of
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Fig. 11. Mudﬂow path of 19 July 1985 along the Stave Valley showing different effects observed by the geologists of CNR-IRPI, Torino
during the ﬁrst surveys. The locations of 22 cross-sections measured during the survey are highlighted. The original map base is 1:5000
scale (from Govi and Luino, 2003, modiﬁed).
 
 
Fig. 12 – The shocking moment in which the mudflow, preceded by a white cloud, reached the 
urbanized areas on the valley bottom of Tesero (courtesy of Fondazione Stava 1985).  Fig. 12. The shocking moment in which the mudﬂow, preceded by
a white cloud, reached the urbanized areas on the valley bottom of
Tesero (courtesy of Fondazione Stava, 1985).
the ﬂuid mass overﬂowed the older bridge and partially re-
moved the roadway. In this section the mud track on the left
side was 10m higher than those observed on the right side,
with a maximum height on the left of about 18m above the
valley bottom (Fig. 14).
Channeledintothedeepincisiondownstreamfromthetwo
bridges, the mass rapidly reached the area of conﬂuence of
the Stava and Avisio rivers, where the mudﬂow gradually
came to rest. The wide, fairly ﬂat valley bottom allowed
the mud materials to deposit over an area of approximately
100000m2. The ﬂat, displaced mass that accumulated in the
Avisio riverbed formed a dam upstream from the conﬂuence
and formed a lake 500m long (Fig. 15).
 
 
Fig. 13 –  Before and after the passage of the mudflow in the Tesero village at  section 20 
in figure 8 (postcard – Foto Trettel P., ed. Artesan, Tesero). 
Fig. 13. Before and after the passage of the mudﬂow in the Tesero
village at section 20 in Fig. 8 (postcard – Foto Trettel, P., edited by:
Artesan, Tesero).
The loss of lives and property along the entire path of
the mudﬂow from the impoundments to the Avisio River
was enormous: 268 people died; 56 houses and 6 industrial
buildings destroyed; 8 bridges demolished; and 9 buildings
severely damaged. The mudﬂow left behind a thick layer of
mud, between 0.20 and 0.40m high in many places, cover-
ing an area of about 43.5ha in planimetric surface and 4.2km
long. According to the proﬁles, the total quantity of material
from the two impoundments was about 180000m3. Added
to this quantity were 40–50000m3 resulting from erosion
along the valley (extending over a total area of 2.7ha),
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Fig. 14 ‐ The effects produced by the mudflow in Tesero, upstream of the two bridges. 
For the curvature of the axis to the right valley, the mass raised considerably on the left 
side to 10 m more than the right bank (photo CNR‐IRPI Torino, July 20, 1985). 
 
Fig. 14. The effects produced by the mudﬂow in Tesero, upstream
of the two bridges. For the curvature of the axis to the right valley,
the mass raised considerably on the left side to 10m more than the
right bank (photo CNR-IRPI Torino, 20 July 1985).
 
 
 
Fig. 15 ‐ Stava creek at the confluence with the 
Avisio River. In its final confined stretch, the 
mudflow triggered significant erosion of both 
sides  of  the  valley  and  the  valley  bottom. 
Along the path, all the trees was removed.  On 
the margins, mud marks reached the tops of 
trees up to 25 m height above the valley floor. 
In the river bed of the Avisio River was created 
a basin extended of about 10 hectares in total 
(deposit forming the dam plus the lake behind 
it) (photo CNR‐IRPI Torino, July 20, 1985). 
Fig. 16 ‐ Just upstream from Stava village, the 
mudflow had a remarkable height despite its 
obvious  width.  This  is  evident  by  signs  of 
barking of the tree (by abrasion of the densest 
part  of  the  mudflow)  and  by  the  apparent 
heaviness  of  the  foliage  widely  covered  by 
mud (as a result of the higher and smoother of 
the mudflow).  Some of the trees and coarser 
material deposited as levees along the track 
are  visible  in  the  background  (photograph 
CNR‐IRPI Torino, July 20, 1985). 
 
 
Fig. 17 ‐ Seismogram recorded at Cavalese station on 19
th July 1985, from 12:22’ to 12:34’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. Stava creek at the conﬂuence with the Avisio River. In
its ﬁnal conﬁned stretch, the mudﬂow triggered signiﬁcant erosion
of both sides of the valley and the valley bottom. Along the path,
all the trees were removed. On the margins, mud marks reached the
topsoftreesupto25mheightabovethevalleyﬂoor. Intheriverbed
of the Avisio River, a basin was created that extended about 10ha
in total (deposit forming the dam plus the lake behind it) (photo
CNR-IRPI Torino, 20 July 1985).
including the destruction of buildings and uprooting of hun-
dreds of trees along the mudﬂow path until reaching the Avi-
sio River. Of note is that numerous tree trunks were de-
posited in long levees on both sides of the mudﬂow, together
with the coarser and heavier materials the mass movement
had picked up and carried with it (Fig. 16).
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Fig. 17 ‐ Seismogram recorded at Cavalese station on 19
th July 1985, from 12:22’ to 12:34’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16. Just upstream from Stava village, the mudﬂow had a re-
markable height despite its obvious width. This is evident by signs
of barking on the tree (by abrasion of the densest part of the mud-
ﬂow) and by the apparent heaviness of the foliage widely covered
by mud (as a result of the higher and smoother of the mudﬂow).
Some of the trees and coarser material deposited as levees along the
track are visible in the background (photograph CNR-IRPI Torino,
20 July 1985).
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Fig. 17 ‐ Seismogram recorded at Cavalese station on 19
th July 1985, from 12:22’ to 12:34’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. Seismogram recorded at Cavalese station on 19 July 1985,
from 12:22 to 12:34.
While the aftermath of the event provided evidence of
how it had taken place and what its impacts were, the rapid
course of events could only be roughly estimated from eye-
witness accounts and ﬁeld measurements at selected points.
From a seismogram recorded at the nearby Cavalese station
(Fig. 17), it was possible to estimate the time intervals during
which the tailings basins failed, the mudﬂow was triggered,
and its destructive passage along the Stava valley took place
(Table 2). Cavalese station is located only 4.1km from the
Prestavel basins. Takahashi (1991) used the seismogram to
interpret the sequence of events during the disaster and de-
velop estimates of the velocity the mudﬂow attained at var-
ious points along its track. Physical measurements of the
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Table 2. Analysis of the time intervals from the ﬁrst vibrations to the ﬁnal deposition of solid-liquid mixture in the Avisio Valley.
Seismogram tracing and times Interpretation
The graph showed a clear increase in vibration amplitude
at 12:22:55 and a more marked increase at 12:23:22.
This is interpreted as the two tailings dams collapsing
The graph showed a more marked increase at 12:23:22. The initiation of movement of the ﬂuid mass
The seismogram tracing showed fairly homogeneous
characteristics until 12:25:35, when wave groups of much
greater magnitude reappeared.
This would correspond to the moment the mudﬂow arrived in the plain of
Stava. Since the distance between the upper impoundment and Stava was
about 825m, the speed of the translation along the broad side of the Pozzole
basin was about 8ms−1.
After 12:25:48, seismogram tracing showed a new rise
with a more moderate, generally quite uniform amplitude
wave, apart from local and restricted larger ﬂuctuations.
Stava was destroyed in only 13s, between 12:25:35 and 12:25:48. Subse-
quent local ﬂuctuations are likely related to local impacts due to the cur-
vature of the valley axis or to isolated structures hit on either side of the
valley.
A renewed increase in amplitude recorded at 12:29:48. This change would coincide with the arrival of the mud mass at the two
bridges at Tesero. Because the distance is about 3km, the average speed of
displacement along this stretch can be estimated at 12.5ms−1.
The seismogram tracing amplitude gradually declines and
then decreases more substantially after 12:31:00.
This is interpreted as the main mass of the ﬂow reaching the Avisio valley,
covering the entire path (4.2 miles) from the lower impoundment in 7:05 at
an average speed of about 9.8ms−1.
Theseismographrecordedsignalsofverysmallamplitude
at 12:32:20.
This would correspond with the depositional phase as the material came to
rest in the Avisio valley.
velocityofthemudﬂowpassageweremadeatselectedpoints
along the track. The velocity of the mudﬂow passage was
estimated by measuring the mudﬂow height on the external
bank versus the internal bank at Stava (where the mudﬂow
entered a wide curve). Speeds ranged from 20ms−1 (sec-
tions 4 and 6 in Fig. 11) to 27ms−1 (sections 5 in Fig. 11).
These results corresponded closely to those calculated by
Takahashi (1991).
6 Critical analysis of the technical literature on mine
tailings dams
Dams have been utilized for water supply and/or ﬂood con-
trol purposes for thousands of years. Since the end of the
19th century, dams have been developed for hydroelectric
power generation and more recently also for the retention
of industrial byproducts, such as mine tailings. Mine tail-
ings dams in many cases exceed the size of conventional
water supply, ﬂood control or hydroelectric dams (Davies,
2002). Despite their dimensions, tailings dams have only
gained recognition as a serious safety hazard since the late
1960s and early 1970s when tailings dam failures became
more frequent than failures of conventional dams (ICOLD,
1995).
Review of the literature highlighted that the problem of
mine tailings materials disposal has been tackled only in rel-
atively recent years and that the focus of attention has shifted
away from a primarily cost-driven orientation to one driven
by an increasing number of accidents due to poor dam sta-
bility, often with heavy loss of lives and extensive damage,
difﬁculty in ﬁnding suitable sites for storing ever greater vol-
umes of waste material produced by rapid growth in min-
ing activities, and complex technical and economic problems
associated with environmental protection, mine reclamation
and potential pollution from waste materials.
While the safety records of conventional water-retention
dams have improved during the last 40 years, the record
for dams impounding mine tailings continues to be associ-
ated with a high rate of failure (Davies, 2002). This differ-
ence in the safety records for these two types of dams at-
tracted major attention starting in the early 1970s. A series
of catastrophic events occurred between 1965 and 1985 (Ta-
ble 3), which increased tailings dam awareness among the
general public and government bodies. Some governments
reacted by implementing new legislation and regulations for
stricter control and improvement of mine tailings disposal.
Technical-scientiﬁc reports were presented at national and
international meetings and speciﬁc studies were published
in technical geology and mining engineering journals. No-
table among these national and international meetings were
Tailing Disposal Today (Tucson, USA), November 1972 and
(Denver, USA), October 1978; Mine Drainage Symposium
(Denver, USA) May 1979; and First International Mine Wa-
ter Congress (Budapest, Hungary) April 1982.
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Table 3. Distance traveled and speed of the mudﬂow that occurred due to the failure of tailings dams in the period 1965–1985.
Site
Country
Date
Ore type Tailings released
(million m3)
Distance
traveled
(km)
Speed Factors contributing to failure
impacts
EL COBRE
(Chile)
28 March 1965
Copper 2.25 (WUP, 2011) 7.8 (WPC)
12 (WUP,
2011)
About 50kmh−1
(WP)
Earthquake-initiated (USGS); lique-
faction; upper parts of recent dam
deposits not yet strengthened (Dobry
and Alvarez, 1967).
SGORIGRAD (Bulgaria)
1 May 1966
Lead, zinc, cop-
per, silver
0.45 (WUP, 2011) 6 (WTI,
2011)
8 (WUP,
2011)
Probably about
30kmh−1 (“Distance
covered within a few
minutes”)
Initiated by 3-days of intense rainfall;
location of dam blocked natural val-
ley; stream diversion fails; dam col-
lapse due to seepage (Lucchi, 2009).
ABERFAN
(Wales-UK)
21 October 1966
Coal 0.16 (WUP, 2011) 0.6 (WUP,
2011)
About 18kmh−1
(Waltham, 1978)
Triggered by intense rainfall; tailings
placed on steep hillside; hillside lo-
cation hosted numerous springs (Bolt
et al., 1975); underestimated signiﬁ-
cance of earlier instability (Mancini,
1967); rapid movement not antici-
pated (Waltham, 1978).
FORT MEADE
(Florida-USA)
3 December 1971
Phosphate 9 (WUP, 2011) 120 (WUP,
2011)
About 30–36kmh−1
(Kulesza, 2011)
Dam height: 15m; the cause is un-
known, although the dam was ob-
served to have been intact and with
no signs of distress 15min before the
failure occurred (Lucia et al., 1981).
BUFFALO CREEK
(West Virginia-USA)
26 February 1972
Coal 0.5
(WUP, 2011)
27 (WUP,
2011)
About 12kmh−1
(Waltham, 1978)
Tailings used as water impound-
ment dam; impounded water seeped
throughtailings; collapseondam face
permitted overtopping by impounded
water (Waltham, 1978); 144 casual-
ties (WUP, 2011).
BAFOKENG
(South Africa)
11 November 1974
Platinum 3 (WUP, 2011) 45 (WUP,
2011)
Less than 40kmh−1
(Blight et al., 1981)
Intense rainfall; An embankment fail-
ure by concentrated seepage and pip-
ing cracks provoked a mudﬂow of
about 3 million of cubic meters:
125 victims (WUP, 2011). Pollution
reached the Kwa Leragane River and
the Vaalkop reservoir.
MOCHIKOSHI No.1
(JAPAN)
14 January 1978
Gold 0.08 (WUP, 2011) 7–8 (WUP,
2011)
Earthquake-initiated (M7.0); lique-
faction; dam height: 28m; the dam
watchman that witnessed this catas-
trophic event said “within about 10s
of the shaking, the frontal wall of the
dam swelled causing excessive verti-
cal movements at the crest” (Ishihara,
1984).
CHURCH ROCK
(New Mexico-USA)
16 July 1979
Uranium 0.37 (WUP, 2011) 110 (WUP,
2011)
The largest radioactive accident in
US history. Dam wall breach due
to differential foundation settlements;
contamination of Rio Puerco (WUP,
2011).
TYRONE
(New Mexico-USA)
13 October 1980
Copper 2 (WUP, 2011) 8 (WUP,
2011)
Dam wall breach due to fast increase
in dam wall height (66m), provok-
ing high internal pore pressure (WUP,
2011); 300 acres inundated; the force
of the ﬂood downed power lines and
broke water mains (Huggard, 1994).
VETA DE AGUA No 1
(Chile)
3 March 1985
Copper 0.28 (WUP, 2011) 5 (WUP,
2011)
Dam height: 24m; Earthquake-
initiated (M7.8); liquefaction (Castro
and Troncoso, 1989).
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From an analysis of this extensive literature, the follow-
ing points can be made with reference to basin construc-
tion and management and safety conditions of containment
plants. Among the various construction methods usually
adopted for earth dam raisings (downstream method, cen-
tral axis method, upstream method), the last is recognized as
the least suitable in terms of dam stability, because stability
characteristics gradually worsen with increasing dam height
(Brawner and Campbell, 1973; Rossi, 1973; Bauer, 1978;
Klohn, 1979; Robinson, 1979; Watermayer and Williamson,
1979; Highter and Tobin, 1980; Lebegue, 1985; Cedergren,
1998; Salgueiro et al., 2008). According to some authors,
this is mainly due to the construction method, which in-
volves dam raising on silts, which in large part are not yet
consolidated. Highter and Tobin (1980) summarized the re-
sulting factors inﬂuencing future instability arising from this
method as: (a) increased pore pressure in the underlying
ﬁne material; (b) differential settlement in the body of the
embankment with the potential development of longitudi-
nal cracks; (c) establishment of suspended groundwater with
roughly horizontal ﬁltration towards the external face of the
dam, facilitated by an alternation of silty and sandy mate-
rials; (d) high susceptibility of unconsolidated materials to
disaggregate not only because of the application of cyclical
strains, but also because of the impulsive action of overloads
or the effect of a rapid collapse (see also Nyren et al., 1979).
Several authors underlined the fundamental requirement
of preventing any direct contact between the decantation wa-
ter and the embankment. This can be achieved by creating
a strip of ﬁne sand and silt (beach formed by a series of
delta welded together) near the dam, but peripheral to the
area of invasion, with the aim of extending and lowering
the groundwater path to prevent direct ﬁltration through the
embankment body and seepage into its external face. This
implies the need for continuous monitoring systems to con-
trol the water height in the basin and assess drainage efﬁ-
ciency (Swaisgood and Toland, 1973; Klohn, 1979; Robin-
son, 1979; Watermayer and Williamson, 1979; Isaacs and
Hunt, 1981; Lebegue, 1985, L´ aszl´ o, 2006).
The most common root causes of many accidents (largely
unreported because their consequences were not serious) re-
sult from the effects of liquefaction and ﬁltration processes,
withremovalofﬁnematerialsinthebodyoftheembankment
along “pipes and siphons” (Swaisgood and Toland, 1973;
Brawner and Campbell, 1973; Klohn, 1979; Robinson, 1979;
Novak et al., 2006; Tosatti, 2007; Braja, 2010).
Tailings basin stability can be affected by all sorts of fac-
tors that concur in various ways. One factor mentioned in
studies is the original basin dam design and whether, start-
ing from its initial construction stage, it can take into ac-
count eventual changes in relation to the production of mate-
rials from mining operations. Mittal and Morgenstern (1975)
point out that the monitoring of placed materials and pore
pressures within the developing structure are critical in en-
suring a stable design. Unlike a retaining dam that goes into
operation only after its construction has been completed, a
tailings waste materials basin is already in operation while
still under construction; dam raising progresses in succes-
sive stages, often requiring adjustments to make it suitable
for the containment of materials with composition and grain-
size distribution different from those contemplated in the ini-
tial project (Guerra, 1979). These overlooked technical fac-
tors are now widely recognized within the mining and engi-
neering community (Mancini, 1976; Williams, 1979; ASCE,
1980; Okusa and Anma, 1980).
In conclusion, a critical point to highlight is that, at least
since 1967, (Dobry and Alvarez) and also later (Smith,
1973; Rossi, 1973; McKee et al., 1979; Watermeyer and
Williamson, 1979; Lebegue, 1985; Bussi` ere, 2007; Rico et
al., 2008) tailings will tend to maintain, even for several
years, a state of widespread saturation, giving rise to a no-
ticeably very ﬂuid mass of high-potential instability. Owing
to their particular characteristics, these materials are highly
mobile. As they spill out of the basin, they cause the dam
to collapse and spill downstream, generating a mudﬂow that
rapidly covers distances from a few to many kilometers,
sometimes with considerable velocity that does not allow
the population to be alerted (see Table 3). Not only is this
scenario consistent with the mudﬂow in the Stava Valley
(Chandler and Tosatti, 1995), it is also evident in the earlier
disasters.
7 Discussion and conclusions
When the Prestavel mine tailings disposal facility was con-
structed, and especially during its later stages, the results of
studies following tailings dam disasters in other countries
were published in international literature. The reports high-
lighted the main reasons for failures and suggested modal-
ities and procedures for the design, construction and moni-
toring of tailings impoundments used by mines. Considering
the events involving the facility upstream from Stava and the
evidence from the history of the basins, it becomes evident
that there were several predisposing factors that caused struc-
tural instability.
According to statements by the design engineer and com-
pany hands that worked on the construction of the upper
basin, the surrounding area was known to be swampy due
to numerous springs. Similar site hydrology conditions were
found at the base of the lower basin and around the founda-
tion of the upper dam and on the slope immediately upstream
from the latter.
From interviews with Prestavel mine employees, a funda-
mental error common to other similar sites, as cited in the
literature, was the belief that the silts deposited in the basins
would consolidate fairly rapidly after deposition. This op-
timistic evaluation very probably inﬂuenced the dam con-
struction methods and the location of the impoundments in
an area just upstream from Stava. Studies on the impounded
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materials showed that the deposits released water much more
slowly than assumed; hence, at the time of the disaster, wa-
ter had already inﬁltrated the dams and adjacent sediments to
such an extent that they would rapidly liquefy.
The assumed, but never demonstrated, notion that the
silts impounded in the basins would consolidate quickly
served to support the operational increase in the height of
the dams. The entire upper basin dam was constructed us-
ing the upstream method, which, among alternatives (central
axis method or downstream method), implied conditions of
potentially greater instability since it required that part of the
upper basin dam would inevitably rest on the silts deposited
in the lower basin.
On the basis of the data collected on the geometric char-
acteristics of the upper impoundment dam before its col-
lapse, the slope of vast areas of the external wall was 38–
39◦. From observation of the two remnants of the basin
side walls, the structures were found to be composed of ﬁne
prevalently same-size sands coming from mill-crushing and
grinding, with interlayers of silts and sandy-gravely mate-
rial borrowed from the slope. The composition of the dam
was therefore not homogeneous, as evinced by shear strength
tests and horizontal and vertical permeability measurements
(ISMES, 1986).
Extensiveportionsofthedrainagesystemforthedischarge
of cyclone overﬂow were submerged in the silts. The tail-
ings materials ﬂowed through two separate pipelines, run-
ning from the upper basin and beneath the dam into the
lower basin. During the ﬁnal years of operation, the upper
basin was used for depositing water and sediment, whereas
only the lower basin was used for decantation. Very prob-
ably, where they were submerged in the saturated silts, the
drainagepipesfailedatleasttwiceduring1985. Theseevents
should have been seen as signaling increasing conditions of
system instability.
In late January, about six months before the disaster, lo-
cal owners of land at the foot of the lower basin reported
observing leakage of water and sand from the base of the up-
per basin just upstream from the point where, following the
collapse, the dam wall had broken. The January event was
a dense debris ﬂow that extended nearly 200m and was at-
tributed to ice in and around the decant pipe. The sudden
water burst at the foot of the dam triggered a local slide over
one meter deep and several meters wide on the external wall.
Another episode connected with the rupture of a drainage
pipe occurred in the lower basin in June 1985, one month be-
fore the disaster. The water pool disappeared and at the site
of the underground failure, there was a funnel-shaped cavity
several meters wide and about 3m deep in the sediment. Ac-
cording to local eyewitness accounts, repair works with the
installation of bypass pipes were completed only 5–6 days
before the dam failure.
A further consideration is the poor safety monitoring by
the Prestavel mine management on the widening and raising
operations by the subcontractors. Besides raising the height
of the upper basin dam crest, the works included the felling
of trees on the slope immediately upstream from the basin.
This was authorized and carried out in June 1985, with half
of the nearly 300m3 of cut wood hauled by trucks traveling
backandforthovertheroadalongthecrestoftheupperbasin
dam and carrying loads of up to 80–100 quintals.
In summary, although no single triggering cause can be
identiﬁed, several factors were seen to emerge, closely linked
and consistent with the preparatory events that led to the dam
rupture. From the documentation it is clear that there was
no permanent installation of instruments for the continuous
monitoring of the state of the materials deposited in the two
basins or the stability conditions of the dams.
Finally, attention needs to be called to the then piecemeal
legislation regulating technical norms for structures pertain-
ing to mines, i.e. works that cannot be exactly deﬁned as
dams as they are not designed for water, but rather for the
purposes of progressive impoundment concurrent with the
construction of an artiﬁcial basin. Nevertheless, this par-
tial lack of a mandate for their control does not limit the
responsibility that public technical ofﬁces can exercise. At
that time there was, in fact, much literature on rules to be
followed for the proper growth and maintenance of the reser-
voirs of mine tailings. Perhaps equally important, the legal
framework does not exist for local planning authorities to ad-
dress this risk to their communities. For example, the iden-
tiﬁed need to monitor conditions in an operational tailings
basin, and if required by regulation, could provide local plan-
ning bodies with information useful in assessing the level of
risk posed to their community. Comprehensive rather than
piecemeal legislation would ensure that all interests poten-
tially affected by the presence of these facilities can be ad-
dressed. The legitimate concerns for environmental impacts
on wildlife or water quality would be balanced and harmo-
nized with those of public safety. Comprehensive regulation
would also beneﬁt the companies involved in activities re-
quiring tailings basins by eliminating conﬂicting standards
and providing consistency useful in economic planning.
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